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Abstract
This article discusses and contrasts the cultural fit, cultural potential, 
communication, direction, and leadership in the success and failures of 
mergers and acquisitions.  The focus of the article is to determine independent 
variables that influence the success or failure of a merger or acquisition 
using existing empirical literature, while comparing and contrasting the 
information found in ten selected case studies of successful and failed 
M&As. According to one study cited, eighty-three percent of mergers and 
acquisitions fail to create their intended value. The ten case studies reveal 
that communication is a necessity, drastically improving the success of a 
merger, and a cultural assessment of both fit and potential are important 
factors for providing direction and guidance for necessary decision making 
and planning initiatives required by management throughout all stages of 
a merger or acquisition. The challenge for today’s business schools is to 
struggle with preparing students to be effective contributors at their next 
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position while simultaneously providing the grounding they need for a 
lifelong career. This is not a unidimensional problem. Only when businesses 
demand what they need from the B-schools will they most probably get 
what they have been wishing for. The lessons from the case studies of failed 
mergers tell much of the story of this disconnect.
 Introduction
A study by KPMG International highlights that 83% of acquisitions 
and mergers fail to create the intended value (PR Newswire, 1999). 
Mergers and acquisitions are designed and executed to create growth, 
competitive advantages, technological acquisition, eliminate competition 
and more in order to create value. But many companies badly estimate the 
complications that can arise during an acquisition, resulting in a “2+2=3” 
rather than a “2+2=5” effect (Appelbaum, 2000; Cartwright and Cooper, 
1993; Hovers, 1971). 
While strategic, cost, revenue and legal issues drive most deals it is 
cultural issues that determine their success. It is not an exaggeration that 
how companies handle culture issues is probably the single most decisive 
factor that can make or break a deal. Although cultural integration is of 
high importance it is often hard to anticipate, analyze and quantify. It is of 
no surprise that the most often quoted reason for the failure of an M&A 
is culture differences. (Papadakis, 2007)
“Increased turnover, low morale, satisfaction, commitment, reduced 
trust, reduced productivity, poor communication, and increase absenteeism 
are all potential outcomes that can and do accompany many acquisitions” 
(Nikandrou et.al., 2000). Many acquisitions have only been evaluated 
based on their compatibility regarding financial figures, technological 
advantages, or market share, never focusing on the soft M&A issues 
(Appelbaum et.al., 2003). 
People issues once were considered “soft” issues, but organizations have 
learned there are hard consequences to ignoring or mismanaging people 
issues during a deal. (Appelbaum et.al., 2003).  Is this acquisition a good 
cultural fit with ours? Do our employees have the same beliefs and values? 
Is this company open minded or closed to new ideas and change? Are we 
dedicating the correct amount of time to communicating our efforts and 
providing the vision and direction necessary for this integration during 
this acquisition?
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An equally intriguing, if not more important, issue is that management 
personnel appear to lack sufficient awareness of the impact of “soft” issues 
(e.g., pos-transaction workforce integration, selection and retention of specific 
personnel, communications with severed and retained personnel, analysis of 
the pre- and post-transaction cultural operating environment, etc.). One 
can speculate from the analysis that management is either oblivious to the 
importance of these issues (i.e., their ability to undermine post-transaction 
strategic objectives) and/or lack the skills to incorporate interventions that 
mitigate unintended consequences associated with the issues.
The purpose of this article and strategic literature review, therefore, 
is to analyze cultural fit, cultural potential, and the communication, the 
leadership, and the direction required in the ten selected case studies to 
accommodate successful post-transaction integration and success or failure 
outcomes. This review is significant in that it will directly compare suggested 
necessities in successful acquisitions regarding cultural integration and 
create a framework for the skills required by executives to assure success 
outcomes. In terms of goals, this article has two basic purposes:
1. To examine if cultural fit, culture potential, and increased forms 
of communication, direction, and leadership are present in the 
review of ten case studies focused on acquisitions, and if they had 
an impact on the success/failure of the outcome.
2. To examine if there are any other variables that should be 
considered in future reviews.
The following section will review literature on organizational culture 
and M&As. Following that will be the comparison and analysis of each 
case study with regards to the information found in the literature review, 
and whether or not the selected variables were present in the resulting 
success or failure.
The Culture of a Company
The behavior of a company has been defined as “the specific 
collection of values and norms that are shared by people and groups in an 
organization and that control the way they interact with each other and 
with stakeholders outside the organization.” (Charles and Jones, 2001). 
“From organizational values develop organizational norms, guidelines or 
expectations that prescribe appropriate kinds of behavior by employees in 
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particular situations and control the behavior of organizational members 
towards one another” (Charles and Jones, 2001). This is crucial in all M&As 
and one of the underpinnings of this article.
Many acquirers need to understand that in an acquisition, it is not the 
assets, technology, or infrastructure that is difficult to assess and integrate 
before, during, and after the takeover, but it is more the people (Feldman 
and Murata, 1991). Failure to fully assess the compatibility of cultures in 
the outset, the potential for compatibility in the future, is unknowingly 
decreasing their success from the outset. 
Research literature has deeply investigated M&As in the last two 
decades. Studies have been carried out concerning several aspects of the 
M&A, including remarkable efforts describing the direct relationship 
between productivity and ownership change (Lichtenberg & Siegel, 
1987), organizational changes and employee turnover ( Morrell et al. , 
2004) and employees’ openness and commitment to large-scale change 
(Chawla & Kelloway, 2004), among others. But do M&A research 
findings provide firms with the solutions needed to successfully compete 
in today’s evolving market?
How can we better control and predict organizational variables such 
as productivity, absenteeism, turnover, citizenship and satisfaction? These 
questions impact all M&As. As research has become more available on 
the soft issues related in the assessment, integration, and post-acquisition 
activities of companies, it is clear that the cultural assessment of compatibility 
is a must in order to improve the odds of 83% failure rate.
The cultural fit, cultural potential, communication, and direction in the 
pre/during/post stages of an acquisition are very important. Cultures can 
be a make-or-break factor in the merger equation. These will be examined 
in the succeeding sections of this review.
Cultural Fit
Culture formation is neither a random event nor an action dependant 
solely on the personalities of founders or current leaders, but it is an 
internal reaction to external imperatives (Schraeder & Self, 2003). Every 
organizational culture is different in style, function, rules, rewards, sanctions, 
planning, structure, and policies, from one another. The assessment of 
these variables between two companies is vastly important to their future 
integration. Just assessing the cultural compatibility increases the odds of 
successful mergers. The closer the cultural fit between the two companies, 
the less adversity there will be once the acquisition begins to integrate 
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(Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001). It is important to understand that the 
cultural fit of two companies can be either too close to realize synergetic 
improvements or too far apart to integrate without drastically negatively 
impacting the integrated firms performance and the level of employee 
performance/satisfaction overall.
This marriage of cultures is a very delicate exercise that affects the 
employees of both organizations. Regardless of the culture that eventually 
prevails, all employees will face the same experiences, such as working 
with former competitors, customers or suppliers, losing their jobs or being 
unhappy (Appelbaum et al 2000). Weber (1996) observes that mergers’ 
performance and effectiveness are inversely proportional to the differences 
between the two top management teams. Managers need to integrate these 
variances.
An example to further illuminate this criterion of fit is the M&A 
between German-based Daimler-Benz and US-based Chrysler which 
demonstrated there was little or no cultural fit (See Case #1). “Chrysler had 
a reputation for having a more freewheeling, open culture, in contrast with 
the more traditional, top-down management style practiced at Daimler.” 
Daimler-Benz was described with words like conservative, efficient, and safe, 
whereas Chrysler was seen as daring, diverse, and creative (Shelton et.al., 
2003). Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) refer to the merger of Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler as a perfect example of merger failure due to incompatible 
cultures. Daimler-Benz and Chrysler operations and management could 
not properly integrate because of the different approach of Germans and 
Americans to work particularly administrative issues such as pay scales and 
travel expenses. Ultimately, a large numbers of key Chrysler executives and 
engineers resigned and Daimler-Benz employees were dissatisfied with 
Chrysler division performance. In essence, it was a failure of fit.
Much of this non-cultural fit resulted in the failure of the acquisition. 
The intentions of Daimler-Chrysler were admirable for technology sharing, 
market growth, shared resources, but a true evaluation of cultural fit never 
successfully materialized resulting in a predictable failure.
The cultural fit seeks similarities in style, leadership, direction, 
communication, and organization policies. Although it is not imperative 
that a company must have similar cultures, it is definitely a hurdle if they 
are so very different from one another, requiring extra time, attention, and 
communication in order to integrate the two.
Another critical issue in the cultural fit between the two firms is 
management stylistics. If the preferences for style of management, degrees 
and ways of planning, formalization, rewards and sanction modes, time 
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perspectives and growth orientations point in the same direction, it is 
easier to design an integrative structure than when preferences are far apart 
(Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001). 
Cultural Potential
The next variable to consider is the cultural potential that is the 
framework in which companies operate, including cultural traits that 
guide the way in which relations with other organizations and cultures are 
handled (Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001). 
The cultural potential of companies is an excellent barometer and 
further reveals their openness to change, mainly affecting the following 
traits discovered by Eiselle (1996):
1. Innovative Potential: openness to new values and ideas;
2. Trust Potential: openness to trust;
3. Mutual Dependence Potential: the mindset of two companies 
working together for the greater good; and
4. Integrative Potential: the openness of a company to sorting 
through issues, understanding differences, and wanting to work 
through differences.
Innovative Potential
In further exploring the cultural potential of companies (Want, 
2003) we can analyze the M&A between Deutsche Bank and Bankers 
Trust. Deutsche looked at the innovative potential between redundant 
departments in the merger of the two companies and in doing so they were 
open to new ideas and ways of doing things. Furthermore, they evaluated 
departments excelling between the two companies, whether it was within 
Deutsche Bank or Bankers Trust, and in areas where Bankers Trust had 
better employees than Deutsche Bank, it was DB employees who were 
made redundant (Salama et.al., 2003).
Trust Potential
In examining the cultural potential of companies (Want, 2003) and 
trust, the M&A between VW and Skoda designed the trust potential 
through supporting Skoda’s company history, past accomplishments, and 
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encouraging employees to take pride in being part of the new company 
(Regani, 2007). This was crucial to the success of this venture and a critical 
indicator of trust.
Mutual Dependence Potential
The M&A between VW and Skoda had a very high mutual dependence 
potential, as VW spent much time understanding Skoda and where the 
company had come from. Alternatively, Skoda was very much dedicated 
to working with VW, and the two companies truly worked hand-in-hand. 
VW developed many reward programs that reflected team integration 
where the best ideas where kept, irrelevant of which company they derived 
from (Regani, 2007)
Integrative Potential    
An analysis of the cultural potential of companies to integrate effectively 
reveals the M&A between Wolverhampton and Dudley Breweries 
(W&DB) and Marston, Thompson & Evershed was plagued with issues 
and aversive from the beginning. W&DB was seen as a cost-dominated and 
hard-nose employer, implementing a destructive winner/loser mentality 
among their employees. There was widespread dissatisfaction, lack of trust, 
feelings of favoritism, poor communication, and jaded employees. But both 
companies realized during the acquisition that issues and differences were 
materializing. Almost at once a plan was derived in order to combat this 
insurgence of negativity. Fairness, integrity, and transparency programs 
were created. Employment assistance programs were created, social events 
such as parties and family days were held, long-service and retirement 
awards were created, and employee reward programs were established. 
The openness of both firms to work through their differences and work 
together created the integrated potential for the M&A to succeed (Pollitt, 
2006). This important case was presented as an example of its significance 
as a model at this point in the article but will not be one of the ten cases 
examined later in the article for congruence or lack of fit with the variables 
selected to evaluate the success or failure of these ventures.
Communication, Direction, and Leadership
It is difficult to separate communication, direction, and leadership, 
since they are concentric. Each has their part to play in the stages of an 
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acquisition, and neither can happen without the other. The direction and 
leadership of a company is one thing, but in the midst of an acquisition, 
a new style of leadership and direction is needed and time and effort are 
further required to create open avenues of communication and information. 
Acquisitions are strategically in need of a culture and leadership style of 
change (Want, 2003). Some of the tactics to accomplish this include the 
following.
Establish leadership quickly
Leadership is the most urgent priority when a merger closes. The 
faster the top management team involved is established, the smoother the 
post merger integration process will be. Empirical data demonstrates that 
a significant proportion of M&As face a leadership vacuum. An example 
of failed acquisitions is Nokia, the global leader in the mobile phone 
business.  Nokia engaged in a series of acquisitions in the 1980s and 90s 
in the consumer electronics business. Their growth strategy actually failed, 
and Nokia exited the business in the late 1990s. Among the main reasons 
for this failure was the “management vacuum” that they experienced just 
after the acquisitions.
Cisco Systems on the other hand conducted over 70 acquisitions 
successfully from 1993-2000, providing a positive example on this issue. 
Integration teams were formed very early in the process. Leaders appeared 
to be approachable to new staff and involved themselves actively in the 
whole process. A participatory style of leadership is needed (Bijlisma-
Frankema, 2001) for employee citizenship and commitment.
Direction and Communication
Top management must help employees cope with the loss they are 
experiencing to decrease the chance of M&A failure and cultural clash and 
to increase employees overall adjustment (Appelbaum and Gandell, 2003). 
Employees exhibit strong negative emotions upon the announcement of a 
merger in terms synonymous with the death of a family member or loved 
one (Schreader, 2003)
Successful mergers communicate as early as possible and as often as 
possible to employees, customers, partners and the media. Cisco Systems, 
for example created the “buddy system”, someone to go to during the early 
days of integration, to help the employees in the acquired company feel 
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at ease and an integral part of Cisco Systems. Cisco also held orientation 
meetings enabling employees to ask questions and get the proper answers. 
The CEO of Cisco Systems had institutionalized the motto “communicate 
early, often and honestly.” Communication is one of the largest concerns 
in any acquisition, but communication is also the most neglected activity 
during the integration phases. Early communication and employee 
involvement drastically reduced the stress and anxiety created by mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Nguyen and Kleiner (2003) point out that communication may be 
intentionally impeded during an acquisition in order to minimize advanced 
notification, which could decrease production output, increase turnover, 
and even lead to a negative impact on the share price. These delays in 
communication only create what they were trying to stop, increased anxiety, 
stress, negatively affecting future relations and trust. Even in the cases 
where management does not feel ready to communicate early on, silence 
is interpreted negatively as a sign of weak leadership and unclear goals. 
Employees are looking for answers to the “me” type of questions. How 
does the merger affect me? What will be my role in the new organization? 
Why should I sign up to the new vision and strategy?
A powerful means for quelling anxiety is stressing the elements of the 
old way of doing things that are keenly preserved, as these are valued as 
competing core competencies. They can serve as a bridge between the old 
and the new structure and as a source of continuing pride and self-respect, 
thus preserving an important function of culture throughout the change 
process (Schein, 1989; Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001)
M&As should not be considered as only a legal and/or financial 
transaction but rather a process in which the lives of people are affected 
(Cartwright and Cooper, 1993). 
Even employees who are fully willing to invest their energy in making 
the new structure work often find themselves at a loss about the “hows” in 
situations of unclear expectations (Bijlisma-Frankema, 2001).   Clear goals 
and expectations are necessary for the current and future direction of the 
organization as a whole.
A vision must be clearly communicated to the new organization with 
very clear lines on how and where the new company is going. Creating 
the change is necessary, as companies that can change have an inherent 
competitive advantage over their competition (Want, 2003). This is not as 
easy as it sounds as the following cases will examine and reveal.
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Case Study Analysis
The following section of this article will include an in depth look into 
ten case studies to determine if cultural fit, cultural potential, increased 
communication, direction, and leadership are present and impact. Five of 
the case studies are considered successful mergers, while the other five are 
considered failures per the criteria and variables introduced in the review 
of the literature. Why use the case study method?
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small 
number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or 
generality of findings. Others feel that the intense exposure to study of the 
case biases the findings. Some dismiss case study research as useful only 
as an exploratory tool (Yin, 1984).  Yet researchers continue to use the 
case study research method with success in carefully planned and crafted 
studies of real-life situations, issues, and problems. 
 In order to truly determine what variables influence the success or 
failure of an M&A, a cross-case analysis was chosen. Our case method 
approach was used in which 10 cases were chosen and then selected on 
the basis of detailed information present to accurately evaluate the level 
of communication, cultural fit, and level of direction/leadership within 
the merger. The cases were selected based on the amount of information 
present, rather than the outcome itself. It was very important that each 
case focused upon the activity of an M&A and that the researcher or 
author was not neglecting any of the details within the process itself. 
Each case was required to possess enough information to determine 
whether Cultural Fit and Cultural Potential (Innovative, Trust, Mutual 
Dependence, and Integrative) existed and had an influence, while 
incorporating the facets of communication, direction, and leadership 
(KPMG, 1999; PR Newswire, 1999).
We have elected to use case studies, since much of the environment 
within an M&A cannot be controlled and confidentiality is of the utmost 
importance in such a transaction. Such real-life situations would have 
been difficult to reproduce in a natural science environment unjustified by 
surveys or experimental strategies. Due to these highlighted constraints, 
a case study method was ultimately the only way in which we could 
evaluate the variables that either created a successful or failed M&A. Each 
case was evaluated on the level of communication, descriptions of each 
company’s separate cultures, and typically the depth of detail regarding the 
management and their decisions. Our theory generating cross-case analysis 
was determined to be the only method that could effectively allow for 
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the capture of cultural influences within a real-life environment that was 
external to our control, while dealing with confidential information and 
highly influential circumstances that could have placed the effectiveness of 
this article at risk.
We recognize that the amount of information that the researchers 
and author(s) of each case study included may be incomplete or limited 
and possibly at times anecdotal. These case studies are focused primarily 
upon the M&A activity and not necessarily the cultural influences, some 
information may have been neglected or omitted due to the methodology 
and unimportance attributed by the researchers in the focus of the specific 
case studies. Yet, the researchers and authors of the cases used for our study, 
focusing on the M&A activity itself, provided a more unbiased recount of 
the situation, supporting our cross-case analysis with a clearer picture of 
the said activities that lead to successful and failed opportunities to Merge 
and Acquire (KPMG, 1999; PR Newswire, 1999).
We are limited to the amount of information that the researchers and 
author(s) of each case study included. As these case studies are focused 
upon the M&A and not necessarily culture, some information may have 
been neglected or omitted due to the methodology and unimportance 
attributed by the researchers in the focus of the specific case studies. 
We have interpreted the findings in each case study by the level of 
detail and specific levels of information for each variable. We have decided 
to only report whether we felt the variables were present or not, by a positive 
or negative response. We omitted what level of presence actually occurred, 
as the quantification of such information was difficult to determine, 
especially since the authors may not have been observing these variables or 
were not cognizant they existed as factors of success or failure. If there was 
no information that could be subjectively quantifiable, it was deemed as 
“No information could be quantifiable.” The ten specific cases and variables 
evaluated are as follows:
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Case #1:  Daimler-Chrysler (Failure)
Cultural Fit: Not a good one. Chrysler had a reputation for having a more freewheeling, 
open culture, in contrast with the more traditional, top-down management 
style practiced by Daimler. Daimler-Benz was synonymous with words like 
conservative, efficient and safe. Chrysler, in contrast was known as daring, 
diverse and creative.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes, the Germans admired the entrepreneurial spirit and innovative thinking 
of the Chrysler team while Chrysler respected the engineering savvy of the 
Germans.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Not much. Several of the key executives who had led Chrysler to a solid 
reputation for creativity, efficiency and profitability retired early or defected 
to other carmakers feeling uncertainty and trust/confidence in the new 
corporation
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
No, this was negatively affected when Juegen Schrempp, the ex-chairman 
of Daimler-Benz moved members of his German management team into key 
Chrysler positions signaling the lack of intent to share the vision.
The management teams resisted to work together and were not willing to 
compromise so that Daimler and Chrysler had combined not much beyond 
some administrative departments, such as finance and public relations. 
Components and platforms were also not shared early enough because 
Mercedes-Benz executives worried their buyers might feel cheated if they 
shared parts with Chrysler’s “inferior technology”.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
No information could be quantifiable.
Communication (Since the merger, DaimlerChrysler chairman Juergen Schrempp has 
acknowledged in a newspaper review that the so-called merger of equals 
was, in fact, a capture of Chrysler by Daimler-Benz.
Direction No information could be quantifiable.
Leadership No information could be quantifiable.
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Case#2:  Ford-Volvo (Failure) 
Cultural Fit: Not compatible since Ford had a highly formal and professional approach and 
Volvo was informal and flexible. At Ford, engineers are not allowed to make 
decisions and all information was passed up the chain to managers, while 
engineers made the decisions at all levels at Volvo.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes, Ford would benefit from the engineering and safety expertise of Volvo 
while Volvo would benefit strategically from being part of the overall Ford 
group.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
No information could be quantifiable.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
None. The integration phase was a long and complex affair. For example, 
Ford executives would be sent to meetings knowing that they did not have 
authorization to make decisions that Volvo executives would be able to do. 
-The Volvo value was lost as Ford gradually imposed its formal organizational 
structure on it. Volvo lost the days of speedy, flexible and “turning on a dime” 
decision making as engineers were no longer authorized to make these 
choices.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Not evident. As mentioned above it was Ford’s way of running the business 
that took over.
Communication No information could be quantifiable.
Direction Ford was maneuvering Volvo into the” Ford way” of running the business.
Leadership No information could be quantifiable.
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Case #3: British Petroleum-Amoco (Success)
Cultural Fit: Different but unspecified per the investigation.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes. The merger managed to integrate the best practices inside each 
organization. For example, the BP performance management process was 
considered to be best practice in terms of generating strong performance, but 
the Amoco model was used when it came to allocating capital.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes, since both corporations worked closely with each other to find the best 
of both worlds.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Yes. The merger integrated the best practice of both sides.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Yes. An effective blend of talent from BP and Amoco was achieved at the 
business-unit level so neither company dominated the merged organization.
Communication Yes, a mini task force and project teams that included HR people were used to 
integrate the two corporations with open communication. 
Direction BP encouraged employees in both corporations to socialize and work 
together to break barriers.
Leadership Yes. Also close management supervision was evident.
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Case #4:  Volkswagen-Skoda (Success)
Cultural Fit: Not evident. After the Second World War (1939-1945), Czechoslovakia’s 
Skoda came under the influence of Soviet Communism while Germany’s 
Volkswagen was a global company. Volkswagen was known for its reliability 
and quality engineering while Skoda was renowned for poor quality and lack 
of innovation.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
The merger managed to integrate the best practices inside each organization. 
Through the nurturing integration practices of Volkswagen, Skoda was able 
to transform its products and reputation into a success story.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes, since both corporations worked closely with each other to find the “best 
of both worlds”. Volkswagen did not replace Skoda managers; it trained them 
through mentoring and continuous support. In tandem management, key 
management positions at Skoda were shared by one manager from VW and 
another local manager for a limited period of time.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Yes. The merger integrated the best practice of both sides.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Yes. Suppliers from both corporations were used. VW also implemented 
what it called Skoda Production System at the company. The system tracked 
parameters like quality, costs, team cooperation and absenteeism in the 
factory, and displayed this information on the shop floor. The teams with the 
best results were rewarded. A common reward was a trip to one of the VW’s 
other plants where the teams could benchmark Skoda’s production practices 
against those of VW.
Communication Yes, Volkswagen management worked closely with Skoda executive and 
middle management. There is evidence of high levels of communications and 
tolerance. 
Direction Volkswagen had a clear direction of turning Skoda into a well respected and 
profitable car manufacturer.
Leadership Yes. Also close management supervision was evident.
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Case #5:  Cisco-StrataCom & Cerent (Success)
Cultural Fit: No, however not specified why.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes, however not specifically identified in the research.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes, since there was minimal staff turnover in the companies acquired.  This 
indicated signs of trust for Cisco Systems by the employees.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Yes. Cisco learned the hard way about trying to change the practices of 
companies it acquired. When it bought StrataCom, attempts to speed up sales 
resulted in 30 percent of StrataCom staff leaving. When Cisco bought Cerent it 
left it alone with the result that most Cerent staff is still in post. Cisco learned 
to use the best of what both companies have to offer. 
Cisco uses a mentoring system where Cisco veteran support an acquired 
manager. This is a painless way of transferring Cisco’s values to the acquired 
company, as the acquired manager will trickle them down to his staff.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Yes. A crucial part of Cisco’s merger activity is exploring how its vision and 
that of the acquired company can complement each other.
Communication Yes, Cisco holds regular employee orientation sessions where questions can 
be asked and answered.
Also one of Cisco’s integration principles is “communication early, often, and 
honestly”. This avoids the atmosphere of rumor and suspicion that can build 
up around a fundamental business change like M&As. 
Direction Yes. Cisco over and over again demonstrated that it had set goals and 
achieved them.
Leadership Yes, Cisco has made over 70 acquisitions to date and its executive owner has 
been actively involved in every one.
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Case #6:  Deutsche Bank-Bankers Trust (Success)
Cultural Fit: (German culture vs. American culture was problematic.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes. Deutsche bank has been a key European competitor in the banking 
industry opening new fields for Bankers Trust while Bankers trust was the 
8th largest commercial bank in the United States. Bankers Trust also had a 
leading edge in technology that can be very helpful for Deutsche bank.
-Transformation of Deutsche bank from a German bank into an international 
organization was the challenge. 
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes. Since Deutsche bank tried to minimize culture clashes through a culture 
assessment exercise during the due diligence, trust was easy to gain. As a 
result, the exercise uncovered that Bankers Trust had acquired Alex Brown 
Investment Group and it was not done successfully. Employees of Alex Brown 
felt that they lost their identity. To gain the trust of the employees Deutsche 
bank top management decided to name the merged company in the USA, 
The Deutsche Bank-Alex Brown Investment Bank. 
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Yes. Bankers trust gained access to the European market and Deutsche bank 
gained technological advancements.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
The best of both worlds was implemented.
Communication Yes. An integration team formed of key executives was in charge of closely 
monitoring the merger and kept everyone well informed.  The team consisted 
of division heads, human resources heads and the CEO.
Direction Yes. The development of a world leading bank was the outcome.
Leadership Yes. There was close monitoring and control by top executives and HR.
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Case #7:  Dollar-Thrifty (Failure)
Cultural Fit: (Dollar Rent- A- Car had a power culture while Thrifty Car Rental had a 
support orientation.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Led to a larger customer base, fleet and a stronger company 
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Successful in combining two rival companies with unique and opposing 
cultures without disregarding their day-to-day business.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Memorable customer service (Thrifty) and cost savings (Dollar) assisted both.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Dollar Thrifty merger was a collaborative marriage featuring the identification 
and implementation of best practices, synergies and shared learning from 
both companies.
Communication Employees from both companies were communicated with and served as 
change agents (the culture ambassadors)
Direction Yes. The common goal was to build a solid company with best of both worlds
Leadership Yes. There was close monitoring and control of resources by both companies.
    Appelbaum, Roberts, Shapiro    51
Case #8:  Southern Pacific Rail -Union Pacific Corporation (Failure)
Cultural Fit:  (Union Pacific had a top-down decision making predominates- that was 
not a characteristic of Southern Pacific.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Union Pacific acquisition’s of the Southern Pacific was a traditional marriage 
wherein the Union Pacific was dissatisfied with the performance of the 
Southern Pacific and felt that its role was to redesign it. 
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Problematic. Managers and employees of the Southern Pacific suffered 
career-modifying actions when resisted.
There were problems of uncertainty, ambiguities and stress.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
None.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
Need to sever organizational difficulties because they took revolutionary 
change and disregarded the human capital from the company it acquired. 
Communication Inadequate communication.
Direction Yes, the goal was to take over Southern Pacific.
Leadership Not a sharing type leadership.
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Case #9:  Renault-Nissan (Success)
Cultural Fit: No, contrasting cultures. (French and Japanese)
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
-Renault had a great know-how in small passenger cars.
-Nissan had the light commercial vehicles and large passenger cars.
-Nissan had the know-how in the manufacturing process.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes. Cross training occurred and culture ambassadors were appointed from 
each company.
-Nissan took stakes in Renault and vice versa to further satisfy this need.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
Yes, the Asian Pacific market of Nissan and the European market of Renault 
beneficial.
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
The best of both worlds was implemented.
Common platforms and engines appeared to be functional.
Communication Close communication during the alliance and continuous follow-ups
Direction Yes. The aim was to reduce Nissans debt. This occurred one year ahead of 
schedule.
Leadership Yes. There was close monitoring and control by top executives and HR.
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Case #10:  Ace-Care (Two Caribbean Banks) (Success)
Cultural Fit: None. Ace was not as customer oriented, was highly centralized, and 
emphasized strict adherence to procedures. The dominant management 
style was autocratic, and relationships between staff members were very 
formal.
Care was quite the opposite: its branch managers enjoyed considerable 
autonomy and flexibility, the dominant management style was 
participatory, managers and supervisors were allowed to challenge their 
seniors, relationship between members of staff was informal.
Cultural
Potential:
Innovative 
Yes, Goal was to share the technology and create a bigger customer base.
Cultural Potential:
Trust 
Yes due to close management supervision and communication.
Cultural Potential:
Mutual Dependence
The highest performing resources from both banks were left as survivors
Cultural Potential:
Integrative
The best of both worlds was implemented.
Communication Continuous communication from management.
Direction Yes. Given by the leaders in banking in the Caribbean.
Leadership Yes. There was close monitoring and control by management from both 
companies.
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
A summary analysis suggests this particular literature review provides 
insight as to the defining success and failures via activities related to 
acquisitions from a cultural perspective. Researchers agree that the culture 
and communication/direction/ and forms of leadership are necessary in 
improving the odds of the now “famous” 83% failure rate among mergers 
and acquisitions. It can be confirmed that communication is a necessity, 
but it is not the defining variable. We found that the cultural assessment 
including the current cultural fit and cultural potential are imperative in 
improving the probability of a successful acquisition while decreasing 
the negativities that are present as two unique organizational cultures are 
brought together. 
There is increasing evidence that cultural incompatibility is the single 
largest cause of lack of projected performance, departure of key executives, 
and time-consuming conflicts in the consolidation of businesses. By not 
assessing a cultural fit and the cultural potential of two merging companies 
and also imposing a style of management or lack thereof, only guarantees 
the fate of the integration, and supports the statistics of failure regarding 
M&As. Our case analyses suggests that cultural fit, cultural potential and 
the increased levels of communications, direction, and leadership are all 
present in the successful acquisitions, while many of these variables are 
missing in the failed attempts of M&As. 
The ten case studies revealed that it was not imperative to have a pure 
cultural fit, but that it was very important to understand the differences in 
culture between the two merging companies. The significant divergence 
of cultural fit did not necessarily confirm a failure; it just indicated that 
increased time, effort, and communication were required and critical to 
bring the companies together. What was somewhat surprising was that 
that cultural fit was not the fact that either culture is similar, but that the 
acquiring company has made an assessment prior to the acquisition of the 
other company, and that it understands the similarities and differences. 
From that point, many companies have used this as an advantage for results 
of increased communication, direction, and leadership.
Cultural potential was a necessity for many of the firms that were 
deemed successful. Innovation, trust, dependence, and an integrative 
potential were all key factors of success. Companies that lacked these 
attributes almost always failed and it proved to be a major indication of 
the success or failure of the merger or acquisition.
Communication, communication, and more communication were seen 
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as the key contributing factor to success. Much of the successful case studies 
highlighted the need to increase communication during the integration 
phase, as this was also supported by the literature review resulting in high 
congruence. Many mergers and acquisitions in the case studies raised 
questions of uncertainty and concern, but much of this was abated through 
constant and increased forms of communication from the leaders, managers, 
and fellow employees. Leadership and direction were also key contributors to 
success in acquisitions. A clear direction and lucidly articulated goals helped 
the companies to focus and alleviated any anxiousness or concerns regarding 
the integration and post merger syndromes.
It is very important to emphasize and note that culture should never be 
confused with values, since culture is concerned with the stability, identity, 
and traditions of the organization (Fralicx and Bolster, 1997). However, 
these two terms do interact with and influence one another. The confusion 
resulting from this issue was one of the major factors leading to the writing 
of this article.
This article has closely examined and analyzed the soft issues 
regarding culture, direction, leadership, and communication during a 
merger or acquisition, but future research can be focused on the impact of 
the acquisition regarding the cultural aspect, but using time, training, and 
examining the winner/loser mentality in more depth. 
Having more access to the genesis and results of M&As as they occur 
would provide an increased perception of the intricacies that management 
is faced with and the speed by which decisions must be made. 
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